

Rethinking European



The five articles which make up JFQ Forum were contributed by an accomplished group of international analysts. They explore a European scene that has been marked by persistent attempts at political integration; renewed appeals to nationalism which fragmented the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; and a Herculean effort at reform by the former communist states. While the response to these events has been mixed, NATO is showing signs of genuine adaptation as 1994 wears on. It is in this environment that U.S. European Command (EUCOM) must operate and the United States must decide its future contribution to NATO. The American forces in Europe spent the Cold War training and deterring—now they are increasingly operational. Since 1992, for example, EUCOM has planned 36 operations and conducted 16, and this with only one-third of the force presence of just a few years ago.

The Maasticht formula for European integration has been set back, although not derailed, by recession and differing approaches to events in the former Yugoslavia. The process towards monetary union may take longer and be less ambitious than originally planned, but some degree of union will probably occur. Elements of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) are already in place as political cooperation deepens. The new aspect of the equation is that the United States no longer sees ESDI as a threat to NATO. It was not long ago that Washington expressed its reservations about the limits of French-inspired military integration. Now America acknowledges that NATO's future requires a united Europe to share the defense burden. The United States and France, long antagonists within NATO, finally recognize that only together can they meet the security risks of this era of transition. In "France's European Priority"

nce again America's attention is being drawn toward Europe. Last year President Clinton emphasized the Asia and Pacific region with its dynamic economies, a point punctuated by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Seattle. This year began with the NATO summit in Brussels and a Presidential trip to Ukraine and Russia. As the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Europe approaches, it is fitting to take stock of the prospects for the region's security.

Security

Philippe Mallard and Bruno Tertrais shed light on current thinking in French security policy.

Europeans recognized that America was serious about ESDI when it proposed establishing the NATO combined joint task force (CJTF) concept at the Brussels summit. As Charles Barry observes in "NATO's Bold New Concept—CJTF," this concept provides for forces to be used in out-of-area operations by NATO alone, by NATO and ad hoc coalition partners, or by the Western European Union (WEU) if the allies agree. In effect, the United States proposed to provide WEU with what it lacks, an operational capability. It is surprising that WEU has not moved decisively to seize the offer. Differences remain over details in the CJTF concept, and France's complicated system of political cohabitation may delay its implementation until 1995.

As Western Europe limps towards integration, states to the east have been primarily divided along ethnic lines. Czechoslovakia split peacefully because ethnic and political maps happened to be coterminous. Yugoslavia was not that lucky. And the world awaits the outcome of the former Soviet Union's fragmentation as Russia and Ukraine spar over Crimea. The Russian Federation itself faces challenges from those who seek independence and autonomy.

NATO is engaged in Bosnia where it used force offensively for the first time in its history. It operates aircraft in the skies over Bosnia to deny flight and protect its ground forces, enforces the embargo in the Adriatic, and supplies humanitarian aid through both airlifts and airdrops. If a peace formula is agreed upon, NATO will help ensure compliance with the terms. The future of NATO is increasingly bound up in Bosnia and with the United Nations. If NATO does not act, many will claim that it does not have a role to play in tackling current security issues. If it becomes mired in a long conflict and is forced to withdraw as the United States did

in the case of Somalia, the Alliance will be damaged. So NATO must act but cautiously in order to achieve success.

Most of Central and Eastern Europe is not at war, but it is strategically adrift. Nations that spent decades preparing to fight NATO now are eager to join it. In January Alliance leaders said they "expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, to bring into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe." NATO has endorsed the American sponsored proposal for a Partnership for Peace (PFP) program which is designed to avoid drawing new boundaries on the map of Europe while providing operational contact among the militaries of the East and West. Although several PFP exercises are planned this year, Jeffrey Simon argues in "Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing the East" that more resources are required to make PFP work. But even with the resources, NATO members will soon be faced with tough questions on expansion.

Perhaps the greatest unknown on the European scene is Russia's future direction. Even if Russia remains intact and avoids the debacle of Zhirinovsky, its foreign policy will increasingly reflect narrowly defined national interests. As Dietrich Genschel notes in "Russia and a Changing Europe," the signals are ambiguous, but the recent U.S.-Russian foreign policy honeymoon may be over. That does not necessarily mean a return to the Cold War, but it requires developing a clear mutual understanding of one another's interests and reinforcing the NATO-Russian strategic relationship whenever possible.

America's future in NATO should be clearly articulated. In "Britain, NATO, and Europe," Lawrence Freedman observes that during the Cold War, the United States, together with Britain, played a balancing role in Europe in a way that was not dissimilar to England's in the last century. Europe still needs a balancing act as well as an insurance policy. America is the only power that can serve both of those roles.

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